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Hester Reeve Deliverance II, 2007 
 
In this paper I will be speaking about my own work; I am an artist first and foremost (also a 
„performer,‟ to coincide with the conference theme, but as in live art which is experimental and 
non theatrical). I claim this identity position quite consciously and with a little difficultly (the 
term has a lot of baggage and because I share Kaprow‟s “nice irony” that, “The art-not-art 
dialectic is essential”).1 This first piece that I am showing, Deliverance II, is very much about 
being an artist and challenging what we think artists do rather than being about „something.‟  
I am also a theorist, but in Irit Rogoff‟s definition of the term:  
A theorist is one who has been undone by theory…If one shares this set 
of perspectives then one cannot ask the question of „what is an artist?‟ 
without asking „what is a theorist?2 
So, I maintain the identity position of an artist but, ironically, we can see in the above live art 
document that I am stating, instead, that “I am a philosopher.” Of course, I state this as an 
artist and as part of a two-day durational live art performance. 
This contradiction is a good way to start this paper, „The 'B' in Philosophy.‟ The 'B' here stands 
principally for Being, an age old area of concern for philosophy and yet as I have it in the title, 
the „B‟ literally upsets the letter order of  the term philosophy just as fully considering Being –a 
considered existence lived out in the world – upsets the traditional notion of what philosophers 
do (write books). But I don‟t suggest this disruption to be destructive, but rather to suggest that 
in their extreme risks, art and philosophy might be one and the same thing. However, we might 
miss it in the rare circumstances that it did occur because we are so performed by a 
longstanding divide between what art and philosophy supposedly do. Nonetheless, my 
practice of making art is as much thinking abstractly as it is making via matter and undertaking 
a Masters in philosophy was more constructive to my work than doing my degree in fine art 
had been.  
It is interesting to note that whilst philosophers rarely credit any „certain‟ artists (for not all 
artists would be in the running) for their philosophical achievements that some artists have 
long been ready to recognise certain philosophers as artists. Paul Valery claimed of Plato and 
Spinoza that even if their ideas can be refuted, their thoughts remain astonishing works of art.3 
However, I can‟t „become‟ as an artist without philosophy, and it is Arendt, a philosopher, who I 
turn to in order to explicate: 
The immediate source of the art work is the human capacity for 
thought…Works of art are thought-things, but this does not prevent 
their being things.4  
This combination of thought and thing is the risk that an artwork is open to, but I am as 
interested in crossing the supposed divide between art and philosophy and ask, therefore, in 
what way is philosophy a thing-in-the-world? 
                                               
1 Allan Kaprow “Essays on the Blurring of Art and Life” (ed. Jeff Kelley), University of 
California Press, 1996, pp. 98-9) 
2 Irit Rogoff  “What is a theorist?” http://www.kein.org/node/62, 2006 
3 Allan Kaprow ibid, p. 82 
4 Hannah Arendt “The Human Condition” (1958), Doubleday Anchor Books 1959, p. 47, 
p. 48 
In Deliverance II I am cheekily spelling out “I am a philosopher” by marking the paper with 
kisses, lips inked up with the colour of blood. This was to acknowledge a violence or a 
violation within the performance‟s modus operandi which was an act of resistance against the 
prevailing expectation on me as an artist.  Namely my being expected to perform value in a 
designated location at a specified time and in front of an audience as if, to quote something 
Michael Corris once remarked to me when discussing the piece, we artists are seen as 
nothing more than “cheerleaders of communication.” I saw the action as a subversive piece of 
graffiti sprawled across the gallery floor; I made the work in the gallery during the lead up to 
the festival and then rolled it up when the show officially opened.  
 
 
Hester Reeve Deliverance II, Prestival, Harris Art Gallery, 2007 
 
It was a laborious two day task, I should say that it was an immense effort to claim that I am a 
philosopher. I‟m interested here in not just claiming art as a species of philosophical agency, 
but also insisting on a bodily involved discipline linked to the idea-world. I hadn‟t planned for 
the supplicating stance in the kneeling but I liked the inference of commitment and goodness 
contrasted with that of my bloodied mouth – as if I was a hooligan who had started a brawl in 
the gallery. 
I resist this inherited paradigm whereby art is valued in terms of its audience because it 
inevitably means art is formed via communication before it is recognized as an act of thinking 
a new beginning. And it seems this capacity for action –something I feel comes from the 
extreme risks of art and philosophy alike- is at stake in today‟s world. Again, I quote Arendt 
from “The Human Condition”: 
In this existentially most important aspect, action, too, has become an 
experience for the privileged few, and those few who still know what it means 
to act may well be even fewer than the artists, their experience even rarer 
than the genuine experience of and love for the world.5 
 
 
Hester Reeve Being & Time, Text Festival II, Bury City Art Gallery, 2005 
 
The title of this work, 'Being & Time' plays with Heidegger‟s famous tome “Being and Time” 
and for three months I sat as an exhibit in a gallery reading and copying out by hand the book 
– dedicating my being and my time to the immense task of reading his book. Whilst perhaps it 
is only in philosophy that human endeavour can clearly focus in on the elusive ontological 
issue of being, such endeavour is held in words, not deeds. This artwork wanted to ask what 
role do such important words play in lived life today where they exist largely shut tight in 
books, books that are within Universities for the most part. I‟m not suggesting that Heidegger 
should be popularised or that philosophy should not be written down (by Heidegger‟s own 
calling, “Language is the House of Being” and I don‟t entirely disagree). I did this piece, on one 
hand, to be able to dedicate my time and being to "Being and Time," to underscore the rare 
endurance that is required to write or read philosophy and, on the other hand, to underscore 
how increasingly exceptional it is to have such an opportunity to do so in the type of world we 
live in today.  
In the work I expose the book in public, I gave it centre stage of an art gallery as a thing of 
cultural value. I wrote out onto human size panels that were framed and hung in the gallery, 
spatialising the book as it were. I was also playing with speaking back to philosophy by 
challenging the tradition that philosophy belongs in books by simultaneously reading and 
performing a “commitment via the shape of a life” in a public space.  
Returning to Irit Rotgoff‟s definition of a theorist, I ask: To what extent do philosophers become 
„undone‟ by their philosophy? What do philosophers risk in their life as a response to their own 
thoughts? I am being demanding, asking after some sort of responsibility. This is not to be 
didactic but because something is at stake once our thoughts are written. In “Giving an 
Account Of Oneself” Judith Butler invokes Foucault:  
                                               
5 Hannah Arendt ibid p. 297 
Thus if I question the regime of truth, I question too, the regime 
through which being, and my own ontological status, is allocated. 
Critique is not merely of a given social practice or a certain horizon of 
intelligibility within which practices and institutions appear, it also 
implies that I come into question for myself…self-questioning of this 
sort involves putting oneself at risk, imperilling the very possibility of 
being recognized by others…the normative horizon within which I see 
the other or, indeed, within which the other sees and listens and 
knows and recognizes is also subject to a critical opening… In 
Foucault‟s view, this opening calls into question the limits of 
established regimes of truth, and there a certain risking of the self 
becomes, he claims, the sign of virtue.6  
It is a tricky issue – particularly if one looks at the rare case of Heidegger, a philosopher who 
did take action in life on the basis of his philosophy. If anything, his misguided affiliation with 
Nazi politics would seem to act as a warning against philosophers doing anything outside of 
writing books.  Of course, I would disagree, but the relationship is extremely risky. So perhaps, 
art – as in ‟art-not-art‟- is the place where philosophy can best act? 
 
 
                                               
6 Judith Butler “Giving an Account of Oneself” Fordham University Press, 2005, pp. 
23-24 
 
 This art work – if it can fit under a category at all - is more of a strategy. It cannot be exhibited 
at all. The above is an image of a tattoo on my ankle, so it is actually more me than anything 
else but it gets to the nub of a lot of my concerns with regards the standard oppositional 
tendency in describing the relationship between art and philosophy.  
It arose in response to reading "What is Philosophy?" by Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. 
HRH.the is not a pseudonym but a „conceptual persona,‟ a strategy they claim exclusive to 
philosophy and not art.  They maintain that conceptual personae are rare, subterranean 
aspects of certain philosophical texts, figures that make certain thoughts possible and which 
have no existence outside of the texts they function within and hence no relation to real life. So 
Nietzsche‟s Zarathustra is a good example of a conceptual persona operating within a 
philosophical text.  
Via HRH.the I am cheekily contesting Deleuze and Guattari‟s confidence in the residence in 
thought that philosopher's exclusively occupy (they of course value art, but state art cannot 
have conceptual personae, it has aesthetic figures that operate purely via sensuous affect); I 
am speaking out within philosophical discourse for a philosophical credence for art. This 
project has a political dimension. Philosophers have always spoken of art, sometimes in the 
past outlining when it was and was not of value, but seem little aware of or wanting to be 
affected by the philosophical thoughts of certain artists (of course not all artists adopt a 
philosophical practice) or philosophical provocations of certain art works. There does seem to 
be a cultural blind spot with this regard and in both disciplines. I take Joseph Kosuth‟s famous 
essay „Art after Philosophy‟ as a key case in point here.7 Here he outlines a very clear case for 
art‟s capacity as a philosophical enterprise (in fact he claims art takes over after the end of 
philosophy). An artwork‟s very essence had become, in his exegesis, a conceptual questioning 
after what art is in a way that philosophy, in his thinking, had ceased to be able to question 
what its own self was. So, for Kosuth, art was no longer an aesthetic project or principally 
about the art object, it was a self-governing on-going philosophical operation that didn't need 
philosophy traditionally understood. Despite the essay‟s constant circulation in art schools, this 
significant point of his text has touched little in terms of artists‟ identities or education. As the 
artist Robert Smithson shrewdly pointed out, “Critics, by focusing on the “art object” deprive 
the artists of any existence in the world of both mind and matter.”8 But there is little rumble 
from the studios, so to speak. 
But, back to celebrating philosophy qua philosophy. I find Deleuze and Guattari‟s outline of the 
functioning of the conceptual personae hugely creative, as it is intended to be. They attest to 
the conceptual personae‟s significance and affect residing in the movement of thought they 
allow for, as opposed to any specific words they might say: 
The conceptual persona is not the philosopher‟s representative but, rather, the reverse: 
the philosopher is only the envelope of his principal conceptual persona…I am no 
                                               
7 Joseph Kosuth „Art After Philosophy‟ (1969) in Joseph Kosuth “Art After Philosophy 
and After” MIT Press, 1991, pp.13-32 
8 Robert Smithson, „A Sedimentation of the Mind: Earth Projects‟ (1968), in Robert 
Smithson “Robert Smithson: The Collected Writings” University of California Press, 
1996, pp.111-2. 
longer myself but thought‟s aptitude for finding itself and spreading across a plane that 
passes through me in several places.9 
Via HRH.the I am suggesting my art practice is at heart an operation of thought, some sort of 
broadly conceived philosophical text, one lived out via embodied art performances. It is not 
HRH.the who lives it out, it is me. HRH.the cannot be visualised, it is not an anthropomorphic 
figure, it is more an image of thought that somehow makes my art works possible. None the 
less, I had it tattooed on my body, as some sort of commitment and so that my body, a 'life-
shape,' was taken into account in terms of anyone viewing the philosophical text I am creating; 
if one is open to art, qua art-philosophy, operating through oneself, one has to accept to be 
changed in the process. To be changed in the process is also to take the risk of becoming 
unrecognizable. This seems exciting, if against the grain of current art practice. 
Incidentally – HRH does not stand for Her Royal Highness, but for Hester Reeve Honestly. I 
am consciously attempting to disrupt habits of thought and cultural motifs. The „the‟ is to 
acknowledge the role that language plays in constructing the sense of self/singularity in the 
first place, it is almost a nonsense denoting nothing in itself and yet making specificity possible 
(in my mother tongue of English that is).  
 
 
Hester Reeve The Critical Girlfriend, Schloss Wilhelmshohe, Kassel, 2007 
 
                                               
9 Giles Deleuze & Felix Guattari “What is Philosophy?” (1991) Verso,1994, p.64 
This is a still from the work screened at this conference yesterday, „The Critical Girlfriend‟ from 
2007. It‟s from my on-going series „Site Specific Readings to Camera‟ most of which have not 
been shown (I am not sure how best to display them or where to display them). These works, 
like „Being & Time,‟ explore the place of philosophical thought in everyday life and each 
exposes a book in a certain site that brings out the work‟s „contemporary bite‟ and continue the 
challenge of „the question „what kind of thing is an artist?‟ by situating the figure of the artist 
utilising established philosophical thought as a medium. I only use texts by dead thinkers 
because I am interested in allowing dead humans to have an impact on living individuals. So, 
with this series of works, I am less trying to advertise the philosophers per se and more trying 
to raise a broad challenge in the spirit of Sloterdijk‟s call for philosophical practice akin to, “You 
must change your life!” Perhaps here the B in philosophy stands less for Being and more for 
Becoming.10 
In this work I read a section from Schopenhauer‟s “The World as Will and Representation" 
besides Angilbert Göbel‟s famous portrait of him which is reproduced on many of the book‟s 
covers. The painting was temporarily in the storage basement of the Schloss Wilhelmshohe 
Museum, Kassel, where many old masters had been stored to make way for Documenta 12 
exhibits in the public galleries. I wanted to question what exactly was meant by contemporary 
art, emphasised by my choosing to read out the ideas of a philosopher largely disregarded 
today for his views on art. (In fact, aspects of Schopenhauer become relevant to concerns I 
am trying to push. For this piece, I read out Section 49 from Volume 1 where Schopenhauer 
states that art is akin to the Idea, disclaiming Plato for only applying the term to concepts).11 
 
 
 
 
           (continued -) 
                                               
10 Peter Sloterdijk "You Must Change Your Life" Polity, 2012 
11 Arthur Schopenhauer “The World as Will and Representation Volume 1” (1819), Dover 
Publications, 1969, pp.233-236.  
 
To contextualise the relevance, I quote from page 235: 
 
"Finally, we can express the distinction between concept and Idea figuratively, by saying 
that the concept is like a dead receptacle in which whatever has been put actually lies 
side by side, but from which no more can be taken out (by analytical judgements) than 
has been put in (by synthetical reflection). The Idea, on the other hand, develops in him 
who has grasped its representations that are new as regards the concept of the same 
name; it is like a living organism, developing itself and endowed with generative force, 
which brings forth that which was not previously put into it."  
 Hester Reeve Virtuouso -Dismembered Sonata for Hannah Arendt, 2013, Bristol City Hall/Arnolfini, 2013 
 
But, I wish to talk more about a more recent work in this series, „Virtuouso - Dismembered 
Sonata for Hannah Arendt,‟ 2013, performed in Bristol and screened at Arnolfini. The book 
here is Hannah Arendt‟s "The Human Condition" and the „reading‟ was carried out in College 
Green, in front of Bristol City Hall in the midst of people hanging out, church bells ringing and a 
demonstration occurring in the background.  Unlike all my other site-specific readings, here I 
was silent and read to myself, but as I read I tapped my body with a piano key (the sound it 
created was amplified via a small microphone) to foreground the body‟s presence within the 
reading of ideas; to suggest the body as a virtuouso instrument of thought but one preparing 
for action (tapping as an action to wake up the body to respond in life to the provocation of the 
philosophy. I was framed by the dismembered keys of a piano spread around me. It is since 
this piece that I have been developing the notion of these performances as themselves a 
hybrid type of art-philosophical writing, a proto writing or an integrationalist text which seeks to 
re-invigorate the „social code‟ and, perhaps ironically, since I am silent, calls after the 
potentiality of any individual‟s voice. It was interesting that after I had finished the work, some 
teenagers came up to me and asked a little nervously if I had been casting a spell? It was 
rewarding that they had interpreted what I was doing as public entertainment and that no one 
on the green „gathered around.‟  
This thinking about certain live art works as a proto philosophical text is in its early state but 
suffice to say, I have found it really elucidating to turn to ancient Greek theories of rhetoric.12 In 
that cultural and historical context, the primary concern in relation to the art of language was 
its link to the artistry of being a citizen – which is not to suggest a good citizen is she who 
makes artwork, the ancient Greeks had a far broader conception of what art, techne, could 
include amongst human activity and skill than we do today. In ancient Greece, striving for 
virtuousness, arete, was not only a common goal of a citizen but interestingly, in terms of my 
position, an activity that was seen not, as it is today, as abstract philosophy but as a bodily 
phenomenon, often entwined with athletics where the term metis acknowledged a type of 
knowing or bodily intelligence measured through one‟s actions or public speech making. In a 
surprisingly contemporary sounding account, an individual, for the ancient Greeks, was not 
viewed as an enclosed identity but one made up of forces (including the social). This 
understanding did not lead to a moral relativism but a commitment to individual acts of honour 
since it is always acts of individuals that connect individuals into the given social reality. This is 
a far more digestible account of morality where virtue was related to art and skill within 
everyday life rather than to universal, moralising experts: 
In other words, one cannot just be virtuous; one must become virtuosity 
itself by performing and hence embodying virtuous actions in public. Arete 
was…not a telos but, but rather a constant call to action that produced 
particular habits. In short, virtuous movements produced a repeated style 
of living-the economy of arête was a decidedly bodily phenomenon.13 
In ancient Greece, the Olympic Games form the example par excellence, where the honour 
being striven after was not just athletic but also poetic and philosophical. Contests included 
public speeches and recitals. Now, I am not wanting to suggest that all forms of live art equate 
to virtuous actions (most contemporary artists would have a huge problem with that for not 
entirely non-understandable reasons). What I find so useful is this conflation between the 
athletic prowess (i.e. the body) and rhetoric (i.e. language) standing as a publically 
acknowledged text of virtue. 
Foucault writes of this ethical model with enthusiasm in his „Technology of the Self‟ series and 
in particular in the essay “What is Critique?”14 Focusing upon the value of an art of existence, 
Foucault also wanted to maintain a boundary between discourse and lived experience 
(Kaprow's 'art-not-art' tension) whilst insisting on an equivalence between how one speaks 
(writes) and how one actually lives (does), what the ancient Greeks termed parrhesia. This 
parrhesia which, Foucault argues, is embodied by Socrates‟ courageous speech in Plato‟s 
“Apology” is not so much freedom of speech but rather a freedom to speak. The onus comes 
back, according to Butler, to the individual subject and their commitment to act; the 
momentous words that Socrates proclaims are granted less by the assembly who have called 
him to bar, and come into being more through Socrates own risking of himself (in that he gives 
a truthful account of himself and, in so doing, questions the limits of the socially established 
regimes of truth).  
                                               
12 The following passages about ancient Greek culture are taken from my chapter 'But 
the real work was to place a stone in my mouth (please remember that I did that)' in „The 
Text Festivals: Language, Art and Material Poetry,‟ edited by Tony Lopez, University of 
Plymouth Press (forthcoming 2013) 
13 Debra Hawkee “Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient Greece” 
University of Texas Press 2005, p.18 
14 Michel Foucault "What is Critique?" in “The Politics of Truth” Semiotext(e) 1997 
Thus parrhesia stands at the opposite end of the spectrum to akrasia and there is something 
to this notion of akrasia, this lacking of command over oneself within the larger moral picture, 
which I am challenging through embodied durational action. Live art action means I can at 
least suspend normality and rearrange what it means to have or run one‟s life for three hours 
or three months even. Returning to Foucault‟s account of Socrates‟ parrhesia: 
[T]he target of this new parrhesia is not to persuade the Assembly, 
but to convince someone that he must take care of himself and of 
others; and this means that he must change his life.15 
A government can never challenge you to be free, only another individual can do that 
(and that can be a dead philosopher through their writing or a living person through 
their actions). 
 
Conclusion 
Key to this talk is an exploration of the relationship between thought and the body, between 
ideas and matter and between philosophy and action-in-the-world. As such, the priority, within 
my own work as an artist, becomes centred on a species of philosophical agency made 
possible via live art performance. I‟m not in any position to state its value, it‟s certainly not a 
theory of performance philosophy, but exercising its possibility as a „member of society‟ in the 
type of cultural reality we occupy today seems significant and extremely creative. I find 
Sloterdijk insightful here and fittingly, I quote from a book titled "The Art of Philosophy":  
Practice, or exercise, is the oldest form of self referential training with 
the most momentous consequences. Its results do not influence 
external circumstances or objects, as in the labour or production 
process; they develop the practicing person himself and get him “into 
shape” as the subject-that-can.16  
However, I do want to relate the process to making art. For all the prepositional and 
philosophical nature of art a la Kosuth's essay 'Art After Philosophy' (which I follow) art's very 
significance seems to be in its thinkingness manifesting through matter, the seeking of a life 
practice premised on making something outside of words. Kosuth too wants art works, wants 
to be an artist and not a philsopher, and claimed so to me in his Rome studio surrounded by 
shelves of philosophy books.17 This „thing‟ aspect of art can be as aesthetically powerful in its 
own right as it is conceptually reflexive  – one thinks less of Kosuth‟s art works and more of 
Cezanne's.  
But since I am not using recognizable tropes such as painting, the way my art works, my art 
things, relate to the viewer is problematic. They do not capitulate to what Sloterdijk terms 
"models of intelligence viewed from the outside"18  and so I‟ve often been charged by curators 
                                               
15 Michel Foucault “Fearless Speech" 2001, p.106. Referenced in Judith Butler “Giving 
an Account of Oneself” Fordham University Press 2005, p.130 
16 Peter Sloterdijk “The Art of Philosophy” (2010), Columbia University Press, 2012, p.6 
17 Hester Reeve Interview with Joseph Kosuth conducted in 2008 as part of a 
forthcoming publication "The Mattering of Philosophy" 
18 Peter Sloterdijk ibid p.78 
that my work is „incoherent‟ (because they are working to a model that artist and art works 
communicate and communicate in terms of their audience as opposed to in terms of the Idea) 
and, in any case, it is perhaps the thinking behind them and the risk of self they incorporate 
which is where the purchase is; the art works are secondary but no less significant. The 
documentation does not seek to communicate the thinking behind the work, more they are 
„images of that it was done.‟ Perhaps we might talk of an aesthetics of possibility inherent in 
the documentation? I do, of course, hope there is an audience –somehow- for my work, and I 
do hope they feel somehow challenged, that is, 'loved' in Arendt‟s sense of the world having 
been loved.  
 
 
